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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson:
Reflections on the Road Ahead
Kenneth F. Ripple*
and
Mollie A. Murphy**
I. Introduction
During its past several terms the Supreme Court of the United States has,
after a long period of inactivity, engaged in a reexamination of the constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction.' Last term, in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 2 this reexamination reached a new plateau. Woodson significantly elucidated the constitutional policy considerations underlying
this area. Yet, as so often occurs in constitutional litigation, the resolution of
old doubts has also brought into sharper focus other yet unresolved issues.
This article has two purposes. First, it will assess the significance of Woodson in the overall doctrinal development of jurisdictional standards. Second, it
will suggest several areas in which Woodson may provide an important conceptual stepping stone for further doctrinal growth.
II. The Woodson Case
In 1977 while traveling through Oklahoma, members of the Robinson
family were severely injured when their Audi was struck in the rear and burst
into flames. Alleging that their injuries had resulted from defective design and
placement of the Audi's gas tank, the Robinsons, New York residents, instituted suit in an Oklahoma state court. In addition to suing the automobile's
manufacturer, they named as defendants the various corporations in the Audi
distribution chain, including World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation (Audi's
regional distributor for the New York, New Jersey and Connecticut areas) and
Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (the local dealer from whom the Robinsons had purchased the car one year before). World-Wide and Seaway refused to
acknowledge Oklahoma's jurisdiction and entered special appearances, asserting that their contacts with the state were not sufficient to meet the minimum
constitutional standard and that Oklahoma's attempt to exercise jurisdiction
3
over them violated due process.
The Oklahoma courts rejected this position, although the evidence re* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. A.B., 1965, Fordham-University;J.D., 1968, University of Virginia; LL.M., 1972, The George Washington University.
** B.A., 1977, St. Mary's College; J.D., 1980, University of Notre Dame. Thomas J. and Alberta
White Scholar in Public Law, 1978-1980, University of Notre Dame.
1 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), see note 20 infra; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see text accompanying notes 3-30 infra; Kulko v. California Super. Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978), see note 65 infra; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), see note 19 infra.
2 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
3 444 U.S. at 286-87.
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vealed no business activity by either World-Wide or Seaway within the state,
no solicitation or advertising "in any media calculated to reach Oklahoma, "4
and no showing that "any automobile sold by World-Wide or Seaway ha[d]
ever entered Oklahoma." '5 Instead, the Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained
jurisdiction through a broad interpretation of foreseeability. 6 The court reasoned that, since an automobile is mobile by nature, its use in Oklahoma is a
foreseeable consequence of its sale. Since World-Wide and Seaway derived
substantial income selling automobiles which could be used from time to time
in Oklahoma, the court found the trial court had correctly concluded that the
defendants "derive[d] substantial revenue from goods used or consumed" in
Oklahoma. 7 This connection with the state was sufficient to meet the constitutional minimum and sustain Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction.
On certiorari, 8 the Supreme Court began its analysis in traditional fashion
through the pen ofJustice White. 9 Invoking the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 10 the Court held that a state seeking to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must have "minimum contacts"
with the defendant and the subject matter of the litigation."' This minimum
contacts requirement embodies two policy considerations: (1) protection for
"the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient

4 Id. at 289.
5 Id.
6 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978). Defendants World-Wide
and Seaway had entered special appearances in the Oklahoma district court. When that court first rejected
their constitutional challenge to the court's jurisdiction, and later denied their motion for reconsideration,
the defendants sought a writ of prohibition from the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 444 U.S. at 289.
7 585 P.2d at 354. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the district court's jurisdiction on the basis
of the state long-arm statute. OKLA. STAT., tit. 12 § 1701.03(a)(4)(1961). The statute provides in relevant
part:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as
to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the person's ... causing tortious injury in this
state by an act or omission outside this state ifhe regularly does or solicits business or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state ...
Although this statute could have been interpreted to preclude an exercise ofjurisdiction over the distributor
and retailer as a matter of state law, Justice White noted that the Oklahoma court did not distinguish between statutory and constitutional standards "probably because § 1701.03(a)(4) has been interpreted as
conferring jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the U.S. Constitution." 444 U.S. at 290.
8 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
9 Justice White was joined in his majority opinion by the ChiefJustice and Justices Stewart, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Marshall filed dissenting opinions. Justice Blackmun joined
Justice Marshall's opinion and also filed a separate dissent.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ....
11 "As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the
forum State." 444 U.S. at 291 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court first articulated the "minimum contacts" approach tojurisdiction in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In that case a Delaware corporation challenged the power of
a Washington state court to adjudicate a suit brought by the State of Washington against the corporation to
recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. In sustaining Washington's
assertion ofjurisdiction over the corporation, the Supreme Court held that although InternationalShoe had no
office in Washington, and neither delivered goods nor maintained a stock of merchandise there, the
salesmen's activities in the state were neither "irregular nor casual." Id. at 320. They were instead
systematic and continuous, and as such were sufficient to establish the requisite contacts between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. For a further discussion of InternationalShoe, see text accompanying notes
42-45 infra.
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forum"; 1 2 and (2) assurance that "the States through their courts, do not reach
out beyond the limits imposed by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system." 13 Evaluated in light of the facts of Woodson, these principles led the
Court to conclude that Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction was unconstitutional. The Court noted that there existed none of the usual "affiliating circumstances ' 14 upon which "minimum contacts" could be established, since
neither World-Wide nor Seaway advertised, made sales, performed services,
or carried on other activities in Oklahoma. The state's assertion of jurisdiction
thus rested solely on the accident's occurrence within its borders. 15 Justice
White considered irrelevant the Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion that
the mobility of automobiles made it foreseeable that the Audi sold through
World-Wide and Seaway might inflict harm in Oklahoma.1 6 Such a conclusion, wrote Justice White, would force "every seller of chattels"1 7 to "appoint
the chattel his agent for service of process" 1 -a result inconsistent with the
20
19
Court's recent rejection of Harris v. Balk and its progeny.
12

444 U.S. at 292. The Court further explained:
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of
"reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said that the defendant's contacts with the forum State
must be such that maintenance of the suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' " InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such
that it is "reasonable ...to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there." 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. at 158.

Id.
13 Id. In its discussion of these policies, the Court acknowledged that the commercial developments
which had originally motivated the relaxation ofjurisdiction requirements had only "accelerated" since the
advent of International Shoe. Yet the Court stated:
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution. The economic interdependence of the States was foreseen and desired by the Framers .... But [they] also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their
courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its
sister States- a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 293.
14 Id. at 295.
15 Id.
16 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
17 444 U.S. at 296.
18 Id.
19 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Harrisinvolved three parties: Epstein, a resident of Maryland; Balk, a resident
of North Carolina; and Harris, also a resident of North Carolina. Harris owed money to Balk who was indebted to Epstein. While Harris was traveling through Maryland, Epstein garnished Harris's debt to Balk.
The Maryland court rendered a judgment against Harris which he paid. Thereafter, Harris was sued by
Balk for the same sum. Harris asserted the payment of the Maryland judgment in defense, claiming the
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit from North Carolina. The North Carolina court rejected Harris' claim on the ground that the Maryland court had no power to garnish the debt. Id. at 221. However, the
Supreme Court held that Harris's debt was a type of property owned by Balk and that its location was that
of the debtor. Thus by obtaining personal jurisdiction over Harris, the Maryland court had acquired the
power to garnish the debt even though it could not subject Balk himself to its jurisdiction.
This long-criticized holding was finally abandoned by the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977). In that case a shareholder filed a shareholder's derivative suit in a Delaware court for a
director's breach of management duties. Jurisdiction was based on a statute permitting courts to adjudicate
lawsuits by sequestering defendants' property located within the state. Finding this basis insufficient to sustain Delaware's exercise ofjurisdiction, the Court held that all assertions ofjurisdiction, whether in personam
or in rem, must be supported by the presence of minimum contacts among the defendant, the forum and the
litigation.
For further discussion of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction prior to Shaffer, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at
196-201; Moore, ProceduralDue Process in Quasi in Rem Actions after Shaffer v. Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 157, 158-66 (1978); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The Power Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
20 Perhaps the most celebrated offspring of Harris v.Balk is the New York case of Seider v. Roth, 17
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Instead, the Court stated that foreseeability in the jurisdictional context
concerns itself with whether a "defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.''21 These connections arise when a defendant " 'purposefully22
avail[s]' " himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state.
In the Court's view, this definition of the criterion for satisfying due process
standards serves two purposes. First, an individual or corporation has notice of
the probability of being subject to suit in those states in which it has chosen to
engage in substantial activity.2 3 Second, certainty and predictability are added
to the legal system, allowing "potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit.'"24

Applying this foreseeability criterion, 25 the Court found that Oklahoma's
assertion of jurisdiction did not meet due process standards. World-Wide and
Seaway made no attempt either to serve the Oklahoma automobile market or
to place their products "into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.''26 The Court suggested that jurisdiction would have been constitutional had the defendants
made such attempts, 27 since these activities would have provided them with
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99(1966). In that case two New York residents were injured in
an automobile accident in Vermont. They brought a negligence action in New York state court against the
driver of the second car, a Canadian, premising jurisdiction on the attachment of the defendant's New
York-based insurer's contractual obligation to defend and identify their insured. The New York court
upheld the attachment and the exercise ofjurisdiction, despite the fact that the defendant had no other contacts with the state of New York, on the basis that the contractual obligation of an insurer doing business in
New York, is a debt owed the insured, and is thus property subject to attachment under the New York
statutes.
Like Harris,Seider-type jurisdiction was heavily criticized and consequently abandoned by many states.
See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 n. 13; Belcher v. Government Employee Ins. Co., 282 Md.
718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972). The
Supreme Court meanwhile had declined to hear cases presenting the same issue. E.g., O'Conner v. Lee-Hy
Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). This past term, however, addressing the Seider question in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), the Court held that a state may not
constitutionally exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a defendant whose only contact with the forum state
is that his contractually obligated liability insurer does business within the state.
Rush involved an automobile accident in which Savchuk, Rush's passenger, was injured. At that time,
both Rush and Savchuk were residents of Indiana. Savchuk subsequently moved to Minnesota and instituted an action against Rush in the Minnesota state courts. Because Rush had no contacts with Minnesota, Savchuk utilized a Minnesota statute to garnish Rush's liability insurer's obligation to defend and
indemnify Rush.
However, rejecting the statute as an inappropriate basis of jurisdiction, the Court held that the Minnesota statute and the Seider analysis upon which it was based permit an impermissible focus upon the relationship of the insurer to the forum. Properjurisdictional evaluations under the minimum contacts standard
require an assessment of the defendant'scontacts with the forum state. 444 U.S. at 331-32. Since under Shaffer
the mere presence of the defendant's property within the forum does not "support the state's jurisdiction,"
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209, the fact that a defendant's insurer does business within the state will not in itself
create a constitutional basis ofjurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 328. The Court noted that, unlike the ownership of
property which may "suggest the existence of other ties" to the forum, Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209, an insurance company's doing business in the forum state "suggests no further contacts between the defendant
and the forum." 444 U.S. at 328.
Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297 (citations omitted).
21
22 Id., quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
23 444 U.S. at 297.
24 Id.
25 See text accompanying notes 21 and 22 supra.
26 444 U.S. at 298.
27 Id. Here the Court cited with approval Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Gray involved an allegedly defective valve which had been sold by its
Ohio manufacturer to a Pennsylvania business. The Pennsylvania company incorporated it in a hot water
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sufficient notice of their amenability to suit and since Oklahoma had a substantial interest in the safety of interstate products offered its residents. 28 But no
constitutionally significant relationship between the forum state and the defendants was created by the possibility that buyers of the defendants' automobiles
might use them in Oklahoma, 29 or by the possibility that the defendants might
receive substantial revenues from the sale of their products because of their
30
capability for use in distant states.
III. The Doctrinal Contribution of Woodson
The two policy themes of the Woodson Court's due process inquiry-concern for interstate harmony through respect for state sovereignty
and concern for fundamental fairness to the defendants 3t-are hardly innovations with respect to constitutional limitations on jurisdiction. For the past one
hundred years, in cases whose names are familiar to every lawyer, the Supreme
Court's emphasis on one or the other of these themes has had an almost dialectic quality.3 2 Woodson is significant because it represents the Court's most
serious effort to date to harmonize these policy concerns. The significance of
this effort can be best appreciated by examining the Court's earlier efforts to
create a firm doctrinal basis for its jurisdictional holdings.
The Supreme Court's early jurisdictional cases are traditionally explained
in terms of their "tests" of "presence" and "minimum contacts." These
"tests" are only relevant, however, insofar as they reflect the constitutional
policy concerns controlling the Court's due process inquiry. Nevertheless,
preoccupation with them has retarded focusing attention on the underlying
policy concerns. A better approach to the cases is to resist the temptation to rely
upon the Court's articulated "tests" and to concentrate instead on the constitutional policies supporting the Court's holdings.
A. "Presence" and State Sovereignty
In Pennoyer v. Neffl3 the Supreme Court, throughJustice Field, approached
heater ultimately sold to an Illinois consumer. The heater later exploded and injured the plaintiff. When
plaintiff brought suit in an Illinois court against the Ohio manufacturer, the defendant challenged the
court's jurisdiction on the grounds that it had done no other business in the state. The Illinois court rejected
the claim, stating that the use of the defendant's product in the state was not an "isolated" instance.
Rather, it was "a reasonable inference that [the defendant's] commercial transactions, like those of other
manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this state." 22 Ill.
2d at 432, 176 N.E.2d at
766.
28 444 U.S. at 297-98.
29 The Court agreed that although it was foreseeable "that the purchasers of automobiles sold by
World-Wide and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma," the "mere 'unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
state.' " 444 U.S. at 298, quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
30 The Court rejected respondents' apparent argument that the revenues derived by petitioners from
their New York sales were possible solely because the automobiles sold could not be used in other areas of
the country. In the Court's opinion, the revenues attributable to this characteristic were "collateral" in
nature and too "attenuated" to support Oklahoma's assertion ofjurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 298-99.
31 444 U.S. at 291-92.
32 Each of these concepts has also undergone significant internal refinement. This is especially true of
the concepts of state sovereignty and interstate harmony, which had originally emphasized the rights of the
states as sovereign but which today embody more of a recognition of the interdependence of states through
the mutual recognition of each's sovereignty. See text accompanying notes 77-81 infra.
33 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer concerned an action to recover possession of a tract of land. An attorney
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the issue of jurisdictional limitations as one controlled by "two well-established
principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over
persons and property.' '34 First, "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory." 35 Second, "no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory." 36 Therefore, a state's exertion of judicial authority over
a person not present within its boundaries was nothing less than an attempt by
the state to give "extra-territorial operation to its laws." 37 In the Court's view,
such an attempt constituted "an encroachment upon the independence of the
State in which the person . . . [is] domiciled . . . [to] be resisted as
usurpation.'' 38 Thus, while Pennoyer established the presence test, its fundamental concern was state sovereignty.
However, neither Pennoyer's test nor its underlying policy concern was to
remain unaltered. As communication and commerce became increasingly interstate in character, state boundaries diminished in commercial importance,
and lower courts found themselves in a difficult position. Although the
Supreme Court had established a test of seemingly simple application, its test
was ill-suited to the needs of an economy impatient to eliminate territorial
restrictions hindering the movement of commerce. Mechanical application of
the test often produced absurd and unfair results. 39 To avoid these results, the
courts developed "escape devices" which, while articulating a result in terms
of "presence," introduced flexibility into jurisdictional standards. One such
device was the fiction that a corporation doing business in a state was
"present" in that state and thus subject to service of process. 40 A second
judicial fiction deemed an out-of-state motorist's use of a state's highways to be
his appointment of a particular state official to act as his agent in accepting process. 41 This agent could then be served within the state and thereby meet the
presence standard of Pennoyer.
B. "Minimum Contacts" and Fairness to the Defendant
Judicial manipulation of Pennoyer's presence test clouded the relationship
had recovered a judgment against Neff, the respondent, for services rendered. The judgment was satisfied
by a sheriff's sale of Neff's land in Oregon. Neff subsequently brought an action to recover his land against
Pennoyer, the purchaser. Neff claimed that thejudgment rendered against him was invalid because he was a
nonresident and no proper service of process had been made upon him.
34 Id. at 722.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 723.
38 Id.
39 Traditional examples of this mechanistic approach include Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442
(E.D. Ark. 1959), in which Arkansas obtained jurisdiction over the defendant when he was served with process while flying over the state; and Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870), in which the nonresident
defendant, en route to New York from Nova Scotia, was served with process while on board a British mail
steamer in Boston harbor. A third case, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), graphically illustrates the
absurdities resulting from rigid application of the presence test. In that case, Mississippi was required to
give full faith and credit to a Missouri judgment in which the relevant Mississippi law, according to Ehrenzweig, had been either deliberately disregarded or seriously misinterpreted. Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at
290. The case involved "acts of residents of Mississippi, done within [the] State, which were violative of the
public policy of the State and which were criminal." 210 U.S. at 241 (White, J., dissenting). For a further
discussion of the problems caused by the presence test, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 19.
40 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) and Philadelphia and
Reading R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917), cited by the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 202.
41 This fiction was acknowledged by the Court in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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between the concept of presence and the underlying policy concern of state
sovereignty. When the Supreme Court addressed the question again in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,42 the link between "presence" and the concern for
state sovereignty became even more obscure. The Court in International Shoe
declared that "presence" was merely a "symbol" for the defendant's contacts
with the forum and the litigation, and that contacts not amounting to presence
could suffice to meet the demands of due process. 43 The Court observed that
due process demands could be met "by such contacts of the corporation with
the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there." 44 Although this arrangement produced a straightforward minimum contacts test, it also created doctrinal ambiguity45 with
respect to the continued viability of state sovereignty as a significant constitutional policy concern. While the cases following in the wake of InternationalShoe
provided a more refined definition of "minimum contacts," their contribution
to the resolution of this question was marginal at best.
For example, Justice Black's laconic, fact-specific opinion in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. 46 acknowledged both state sovereignty and fairness
to the defendant, but gave little indication of their relative importance. McGee
upheld California's assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident whose only activity in the state concerned the contract at issue in the litigation. In one sense,
the opinion affirmed InternationalSlioe's basic "fairness to the defendant" rationale. The Court's commentary on the diminished burden most defendants
faced in litigating in foreign jurisdictions, 47 and its remark that mere inconvenience would not constitute a denial of due process, 48 are most easily construed
as a liberal interpretation of the minimum contacts test. At the same time,
however, Justice Black observed that Pennoyer placed "some limit on the power
of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons not served with process within their boundaries." 49 Citing Pennoyer, Justice Black noted that the
contract at issue "had [a] substantial connection' '50 with California and that
42
43
44
45

326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a general discussion of International Shoe, see note 11 supra.
326 U.S. at 316-17.
Id. at 317.
The ambiguity was compounded by the Court's expression of the new test:

[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, i/he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that

the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
This language left open the possibility that presence alone was an alternative to "minimum contacts."
46 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, plaintiff-petitioner was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy pur-

chased by her son, a resident of California. Defendant-respondent was a Texas insurance corporation which
had agreed to assume the obligations of the company from which the son had procured the policy, and offered to insure the son on the terms of his previous policy. The son accepted the offer and paid his premiums
to the Texas corporation. Upon his death, petitioner sought payment on the policy. When the insurance
company refused to pay the benefits, petitioner brought suit in a California court. The California court
rendered ajudgment against the insurance company, which then challenged the court's power to adjudicate
the dispute on the grounds that it had no contacts with California other than the insurance contract being

sued upon.
47 "[M]odern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued
to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity." 355 U.S. at 223..
48 "Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California
where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process." 355 U.S. at 224.
49 Id. at 222.
50 Id. at 223.
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the State therefore had a "manifest interest" 51 justifying its protection of its
52
citizens.
Six months later, the Court in Hanson v. Denckla5 3 issued a warning signal
to the lower courts designed to insure that equal emphasis was given to the second word of the InternationalShoe test: minimum contacts still required meaningful
contacts. The Court did little, however, to clarify the relationship between the
two policy concerns articulated in the earlier cases. Like McGee, Hanson referred obliquely to both state sovereignty and fairness to the defendant without
adequately describing their interrelationship or their relative importance.
While acknowledging the evolution of jurisdictional standards from the "rigid
rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, ,,54 Hanson noted that the remaining restrictions were
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenience or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a
defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal
contacts" with that State which are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over
him. 55

After Hanson, the Supreme Court entered an era of benign neglect with
respect to the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction, leaving the lower courts
to wrestle as best they could with the process of further refining the concept of
minimum contacts. Unfortunately, the resulting interpretations reflected a
disregard of Hanson's warning5 6 and an emphasis upon the "minimum" aspect
57
of the standard.
C. The Current Reassessment Begins
When the Supreme Court undertook its current reassessment ofjurisdic51
52

Id.
Id. The Court explained:
California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents
when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if
they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford
the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgmentproof.
53 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Hanson concerned a dispute over the right to a trust created by a Florida resident when domiciled in Pennsylvania. The trust was established in Delaware and administered by a
Delaware trustee. After her death, the settlor's will was probated in a Florida state court. The residuary
legatees of the will claimed that the trust assets should pass to them and petitioned a Florida chancery court
for a declaratory judgment to that effect. That court rendered such ajudgment but failed to acquire personal
jurisdiction over an indispensable party, the Delaware trustee. Meanwhile, the executrix of the will instituted a declaratory judgment action in Delaware state court. The Delaware court refused to give full faith
and credit to the Florida decree because the Florida court had lacked personal jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee. Agreeing that the necessary personal jurisdiction had not been obtained, the Supreme Court held
that jurisdiction over the trustee must meet InternationalShoe's minimum contacts standard. Satisfaction of
the standard required "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 357 U.S. at 253.
54 Id. at 251.
55 Id.
56 See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
57 See, e.g., Ladd v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 456 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (personal jurisdiction over defendant airline existed in Tennessee on basis of airline's maintenance of listings of out-of-state,
toll-free numbers in telephone directories of six Tennessee cities; circulation in state of national publications
in which airline placed periodic advertisements; regular calls by sales personnel; and sale of tickets by independent travel agents).
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tional principles in 1976, the theoretical ambiguities engendered by International
Shoe and perpetuated by its progeny remained. The relative importance of state
sovereignty and of fairness to the defendant was still largely undetermined.
"Presence" had been analytically divorced from its roots in state sovereignty
framework of "minimum contacts" had
concerns, but its role within the
58
received no further elaboration.
The first case of the modern reassessment, Shaffer v. Heitner,59 resolved the
latter issue. Shaffer made clear that the minimum contacts test of International
Shoe was the measure of "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction." ,60 Thus the
presence of property in a state was an inadequate jurisdictional predicate,
although that presence might "bear on the existence of jurisdiction by pro'
viding contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. "61
The question remained, however, whether the Court's concern for the role of
state sovereignty in jurisdictional questions would be as effectively dismissed.
In Slaffer, it appeared that such was the case. Writing for the Court, Justice
Marshall declared that under the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe
"the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather
than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal
jurisdiction. " 62Justice Marshall found Hanson's language concerning the "territorial limitations on the power of the respective States" 63 to be not inconsistent with this interpretation, but merely a reiteration of the truism that "the
States are defined by their geographical territory. "64 Thus, after Shaffer, any
consideration of a sister state's interests in the evaluation of judicial power
seemed superfluous, and was perhaps precluded absent special circumstances.
A year later, in Kulko v. CaliforniaSuperior Court,65 the Supreme Court confirmed Shaffer's concern for fairness to the defendant as the controlling constitutional policy consideration. While it acknowledged that "the interests of the.
forum State and of the plaintiff in proceeding with the cause in the plaintiffs
forum of choice ' 66 should be considered, the Court emphasized that the
"quality and nature" of the defendant's activity chiefly determined whether it
58 See notes 11 and 45 supra.
59 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See note 19 supra.
60 Id. at 212.
61 Id. at 207.
62 Id. at 204.
63 357 U.S. at 251. See note 55 supra.
64 433 U.S. at 204 n. 20.
65 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Kulko involved a custody and support action brought by a California resident
against her former husband, a New York resident. The couple had negotiated a separation agreement under
which their two children spent part of the year with each parent and the mother was paid child support during those periods which the children spent with her. One of the children thereafter expressed a desire (in
which her father acquiesced) to live most of the year with her mother contrary to the terms of the separation
agreement. Three years later the other child moved to California, and the mother brought suit in a California court seeking permanent custody and increased child support payments. The father challenged the
California court's jurisdiction, claiming he had no contacts with the state sufficient to meet the constitutional standard. The California court rejected the father's claim on the ground that by acquiescing in his
child's desire to live in California he had availed himself of the benefits of the state and derived direct
economic advantage therefrom. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 524-25; 564 P.2d 353, 358; 138
Cal. Rptr. 586, 591 (1977) (en banc).
For a thorough discussion of Kulko and its aftermath, see Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts underthe
Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REy. 175 (1979).
66 436 U.S. at 92.
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was "reasonable" and "fair" to require the defendant to conduct his defense
67
in that state.
D. Woodson's "Harmonization"
Having emphasized fairness to the defendant in both Shaffer and Kulko, the
Supreme Court might have been expected to resolve Woodson on the same
basis. Woodson's facts certainly permitted such an approach. 68 However,
writing for the Court, Justice White confronted the long-standing ambiguity
regarding the theoretical basis of the Court's prior jurisdictional decisions and
presented an analysis which represented the first serious attempt to harmonize
the two policy concerns of protecting "the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum ' 69 and assuring that "the States,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 70 The Justice referred to
these concerns as "related, but distinguishable." '7 1 Woodson's significance lies
in its exposition of how these concerns are "related" and how they are
"distinguishable."
How "related" the concepts are in the Court's view is apparent from the
discussion in Woodson of possible unfairness to the defendant. Justice White
stresses that the reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction may not be determined by simply assessing the "burden on the defendant." ' 72 In "an appropriate case," that burden must be considered in light of other relevant factors: the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining an efficient resolution to the controversy; and the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies. 73 Yet when Justice White turns to the second policy consideration, "the principles of interstate federalism,'' 74 many of the same factors
again predominate. 7- Indeed, in applying these factors, the Justice makes no
attempt to distinguish between their effect on fundamental fairness to the
76
defendant and their effect on interstate federalism.
67 Id., citing InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
68 The Court might easily have proceeded under the traditional due process test of International Shoe.
Since the petitioners carried on no activities in Oklahoma, making no sales, engaging in no advertising, and
making no attempt to serve the Oklahoma market, they availed themselves of "none of the privileges and
benefits of Oklahoma law." 444 U.S. at 295. Thus, there existed no minimum contacts among the defendants, the forum and the litigation sufficient to sustain Oklahoma's exercise ofjurisdiction over World-Wide
and Seaway under the constitutional standard established in InternationalShoe.
69 444 U.S. at 292.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 291-92.
72 Id. at 292.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 293.
75 In speaking of the "principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution," Justice White
stressed that the "sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister
States ....
" 444 U.S. at 293. Thus, "States through their courts [might] not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." Id. at 292. The factors discussed
by the Court with respect to the "protection against inconvenient litigation" also seem supportive of this
federalism concept: "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies" and the "shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies." Id.
76 See 444 U.S. at 295-99.
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Had the Court's analysis ended at this point, Woodson would have shed littie new light on the theoretical ambiguity plaguing earlier jurisdiction cases; it
would have indicated only that concerns of interstate federalism should be appropriately weighed with concerns for fairness to the defendant. 7 7 But Woodson
went a step further. Despite its explicit approval of Shaffer's abandonment of
the presence test, 78 it subtly but emphatically transformed Pennoyer's concern
for state sovereignty into a far broader concept. After Woodson, "state
sovereignty" is no longer a self-contained quality designed simply to preserve
the dignity of the individual state. Rather, it has been recast as an essential element of interstate federalism 79-a relationship preserved only when "the
states, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.''80 Indeed,
noted the Woodson court, this interstate federalism concern could justify denial
of jurisdiction even when there is no unfairness to the defendant and when the
forum seeking to assert jurisdiction is more convenient than any other.81
Here Woodson stops. Having emphasized the role of interstate federalism,
the Court gives only the vaguest idea of what this emphasis will mean in concrete application. Yet, the Court has indicated its jurisprudential vector sufficiently to permit an assessment of the impact of the constitutional policies set
out in Woodson upon the Court's resolution of future jurisdictional problems.
IV. Woodson's Impact on Future Jurisdictional Standards
Although Woodson is hardly the Supreme Court's last word on personal
jurisdiction, its stress on the requirements of interstate federalism warrants a
fresh look at several jurisdictional predicates which, until now, have been
generally accepted despite their inadequate theoretical foundations.
A. TransientJurisdiction
Unlike most other legal systems of the Western world, American courts
have traditionally asserted jurisdiction over a defendant solely on the basis of
his presence within the boundaries of the state at the time he is served with process. The historical roots of such "transient" jurisdiction have been hotly
debated. 82 Yet, for many years, its constitutionality was not questioned. Cer77
78
79
80
81

See text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
444 U.S. at 296.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 292.
In the Court's words:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate
before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its
law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id. at 294.
82 Professor Ehrenzweig states that commentators and courts have found historical legitimacy for the
presence test in either the doctrine of physical power or the concept of the transitory action. See note 19 supra.
The doctrine of physical power was best expressed in Justice Holmes's statement in McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915), that "the foundation ofjurisdiction is physical power." According to Ehrenzweig,
"[m]ost expressions of the general transient rule [were] buttressed by little more than a reference" to this
statement. Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at 296.
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tainly, it fit comfortably within the judicial philosophy reflected in the presence
test of Pennoyer and was compatible with Justice Holmes's comment that the
"foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."8 3 Even InternationalShoe, with
its minimum contacts approach, gave no firm indication that the validity of
transient jurisdiction had been diminished. First, as noted above, 84 International
Shoe contained a textual loophole which preserved the presence test: the
minimum contacts test governed only if the defendant were "not present
within the territory of the forum.' '85 Second, although InternationalShoe and its
progeny addressed the question of corporate presence, they left unresolved the
question whether their rationale applied equally to individual defendants.
Shaffer and Kulko made clear, however, that the minimum contacts test applied to both corporate and individual defendants and supplied the standard
against which all assertions of jurisdiction must be measured. 86 Thus, as the
scholarly commentary on Shaffer indicated, the survival of transient jurisdiction
after Shaffer seemed improbable. 87 It was simply too difficult to find the required relationship among the forum, the defendant and the subject matter of
the litigation where the defendant's presence in the state was not related to the
litigation and where no other connection between the state and the litigation
existed. Certainly the policy consideration so strongly relied upon in Shaffer-protection of the defendant from litigation in an inconvenient
forum 88-was ill-served under this mode of jurisdiction. Indeed, there was a
distinct potential for unfairness in requiring a person with no continuing relationship to the forum to litigate a matter which also had no relationship to the
forum.
At first glance, it may seem that Woodson's emphasis on the rights of states
would breathe new life into the concept of transitory jurisdiction. But in
transforming Pennoyer's concept of state sovereignty into a broader concern for
interstate federalism, 8 9 Woodson did not necessarily adopt Pennoyer's "ter-

ritorialist" view of jurisdiction. The Woodson Court's explicit approval of Shaffet's

abandonment

of the

presence

test and

its condemnation

of the

The second historical source, the concept of the transitory action, is generally considered to have
originated with Blackstone's comment that in actions "for injuries that might have happened anywhere, as
debt, detinue, slander and the like, the plaintiff may declare in what county he pleases, and then the trial
must be in that in which the declaration is laid." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *294. See, e.g., BOOTE,
AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF AN ACTION OR SUIT AT LAW 97 (4th ed. 1805); 1 PAINE & DUER, NEw YORK
PRACTICE 88 (1st ed. 1930); and Genin v. Grier, 10 Ohio 209 (1840). For an in-depth discussion of the
validity of these concepts as historical authority for the transient rule, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at
293-303.
83 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). See also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246.
84 See note 45 supra.

85

326 U.S. at 316.

86 See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
87 See, e.g., Sedler,JudicialJurisdictionand Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA
L. REV. 1031 (1978); Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam
Jurisdiction over Individuals Based on Presence. 25 VILL. L. REv. 38 (1979); McLaughlin, TerritorialDue Process:
Analysis of an Emergent Doctrine, 81 W.VA. L. REv. 355 (1979).
88 See text accompanying note 62 supra. Different considerations of fundamental fairness to the defendant may govern, however, when a federal court exercises in personam jurisdiction over a foreign transient
with respect to an alleged violation of the law of nations. Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090 (2d Cir.
June 30, 1980) (assuming the validity of transient jurisdiction or jurisdiction based on temporary residency
under a short-term visitor's visa, while sustaining the federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction
under the Alien Torture Statute, 28 U.S.C § 1350, over a claim for damages based on allegations of torture
in a foreign country).
89 See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
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"analogous"

proposition that "[e]very seller of chattels . . . in effect,
appoint[s] the chattel his agent for service of process" 90 confirm that the
Court's emphasis on interstate federalism does not include approval ofjurisdiction based on mere presence.
A proponent of transient jurisdiction must now face the serious question of
whether such ajurisdictional basis would precipitate the strain on the interstate
system which Woodson condemns. More precisely, from two distinct analytical
perspectives, Woodson seems io have delivered the final blow to transitory
presence as a predicate of jurisdiction. First, an assertion of transient jurisdiction deprives another state having "minimum contacts" with the dispute of its
opportunity to resolve the matter in its own courts. This overreaching of
judicial jurisdiction was Justice White's explicit concern in Woodson. 91 Second,
an assertion of judicial jurisdiction on the basis of transitory presence makes
possible significant strains on the federal structure by inhibiting regular
economic relationships among the states. As Professor Schlesinger has noted:
For the very reason that it breathes an isolationist spirit of self-help and
self-sufficiency, the rule [of transient presence] may have appealed to
American courts in pioneer days. But how can a rule having such an origin
provide the subtle cooperative adjustments of competing jurisdictional claims
which are necessary in order to promote further growth of a teeming interstate
and international commerce in the second half of the twentieth century. 92
The judicial overreaching possible under the transitory presence theory implicates the dangers to interstate relations which the Woodson Court condemned
when it noted that the "economic interdependence of the States was foreseen
and desired by the Framers." 93 Whether the out-of-stater finds himself the object of discriminatory taxes, 94 discriminatory trade barriers, 95 or the exercise of
judicial power by a state unrelated to him or to the dispute in question, the impact on interstate harmony is the same.
B. "General Predicates" ofJurisdiction
Woodson did not address whether the general jurisdictional bases, originally premised on Pennoyer's "presence" analysis, remain constitutional. Despite
InternationalShoe's minimum contacts test, an exercise of jurisdiction by the
state of a defendant's domicile or residence has long been considered constitutionally permissible. 96 Similarly, a corporate defendant has been assumed to be
90 444 U.S. at 296.
91 "The concept of minimum contacts ... acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 444
U.S. at 292.
92 Schlesinger, Methods of Progressin Conflict of Laws: Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of 'Transient'
Jurisdiction, 9J. PuB. L. 313, 317 (1960).
93 444 U.S. at 293.
94 See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (striking down the New Hampshire "Commuters Income Tax" as implementing a tax structure discriminatory to out-of-state residents).
95 See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding void a labeling
scheme designed to deprive Washington State apples of their market advantage).
96 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) rehearingdenied, 312 U.S. 712 (1941) (Wyoming
judgment based on a summons handed to Wyoming domiciliary in Colorado held entitled to full faith and
credit and Wyoming deemed to have valid jurisdiction over its domiciliary). See also Mounts v. Mounts, 181
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amenable to the jurisdiction of a state where the corporation "continually and
systematically" does business. 97 In all probability, jurisdiction based on
domicile or residence will continue to be sustained by the Court after Woodson.
The "fairness to the defendant" consideration is satisfied since the defendant
has the requisite "contacts, ties, or relations" '98 with the state of his domicile
and can properly be expected to answer for his actions there. The "interstate
harmony" consideration seems likewise satisfied, since a state has a legitimate
interest in ensuring that its domiciliaries and residents are amenable to the
jurisdiction of its courts. And while other states may also have an interest in
serving as a forum, Woodson does not mandate that the most appropriate forum
be chosen. Thus, unless the plaintiffs choice of forum is restricted and he cannot obtain "convenient and effective relief' 99 in the defendant's state of
residence, there would seem to be no constitutional reason to prevent that state
from exercising jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's domicile or
residence.
C. Long-Arm Jurisdiction- The Nonresident CorporateDefendant
It is more difficult to assess in the abstract the actual impact of Woodson on
traditional forms of long-arm jurisdiction. This difficulty is compounded by the
Supreme Court's apparent assumption that the same factors are relevant in
assessing the concerns of both interstate federalism and fairness to the defendant. ° ° Woodson cautions lower courts to be more sensitive to matters of interstate federalism, and such an attitudinal shift by the courts can be expected.
However, there will almost certainly be more concrete manifestations of the
new doctrinal balance struck in Woodson. In all likelihood, the Court's reformulation of the foreseeability test will be the focal point in litigation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already been confronted with one such
significant instance. Shortly after its decision in Woodson, the Court denied certiorari in a case involving the amenability to suit of a nonresident corporate
defendant based on contractual dealing with a resident plaintiff."t " Justice
White, the author of Woodson, dissented from denial of certiorari t 2 He
described the issue as one which had "deeply divided the federal and state
03
courts. ''1
Neb. 452, 149 N.W.2d 435 (1967); Myrick v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 2d 810, 256 P.2d 348, aff'd, 41 Cal.
2d 519, 261 P.2d 255 (1953). For a general discussion of these bases ofjurisdiction, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW 61-63 (3d ed. 1977).
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 47(2) (1971). See also Hoffman v. Air India, 393
F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533,
227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); Lindley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
276 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (rev'd on other grounds).
Professor Weintraub has noted that the use of "doing business" as a generally affiliating nexus for
jurisdiction purposes requires a preliminary review of the forum's jurisdictional statute. Some state statutes
restrict the use of this jurisdictional predicate to causes of action arising out of forum business, while others
permit its use in actions unrelated to the business activities in the forum. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 147 (2d ed. 1980).
98 326 U.S. at 319.
99 444 U.S. at 292.
100 See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
101 Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 100 S.Ct. 1087 (1980).
102 100 S. Ct. at 1088-89 (White, J. dissenting, joined by Powell, J.).
103 100 S.Ct. at 1089.
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The cases cited by Justice White reveal, perhaps not unsurprisingly, that
the division in the courts is more fact-specific than doctrinal and usually arises
when a resident seller attempts to sue a nonresident purchaser in the seller's
jurisdiction pursuant to a long-arm statute.1 0 4 Before Woodson, the issue had
been whether the purchaser's contracting for certain goods or services provided
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction. Results therefore turned on the significance which the particular
court placed on such occurrences as: (1) which party initiated the
transactions, 10 5 (2) the degree to which the purchaser communicated with or
visited the office of the buyer,10 6 (3) whether the goods were delivered FOB at
the seller's location in the forum,10 7 (4) whether the contract specified that the
law of the forum was to govern, 10 8 (5) whether the purchaser controlled or had
specific knowledge of the place of the seller's performance, 0 9 and (6) whether
the nonresident purchaser inspected the goods at the seller's location before acceptance.1 10
It was perhaps more than a coincidence that it was the author of Woodson
who dissented from the Court's denial of certiorari on this issue. Woodson's
more precise articulation of the theoretical basis of the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction,"' and its formulation of a more concrete standard of
foreseeability,l 1 2 may help clarify standards in this area. In deciding whether to
104 In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lakeside Bridge and Steel, Justice White collected the
federal and state court cases arguably in conflict with the lower court decision:
Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (CA10 1977); UnitedStatesR. Equip.
Co. v. Port Huron &Detroit R. Co., 495 F.2d 1127 (CA7 1974); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,
495 F.2d 483, 494-499 (CA5 1974); Ajax Realty Corp. v.J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (CA4 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 2148, 36 L.Ed.2d 687 (1973); In-FlightDevices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (CA6 1972); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (CA7
1971); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (CA8 1969); Manufacturers'
Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 565 P.2d 864 (1977) (en bane); Colony
Press, Inc. v. M.J. Fleeman, 17 Ill.App. 3d 74, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974); Miller v. Glendale Equipment &
Supply, Inc., 344 So.2d 736 (Miss. 1977); McIntosh v. Navaro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868
(1970); State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968) (en
banc); Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa.Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974);
Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis.2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970), appeal dismissed 402 U.S.
902, 91 S.Ct. 1379, 28 L.Ed.2d 643 (1971). Cases arguably supporting the decision below include: Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engineers, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 167 (CA9 1975) (dictum); W4ittaker Corp. v. UnitedAircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1084-1085 (CA1 1973) (construing state law); E.
R. CallenderPrintingCo. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 25, 510 P.2d 889 (1973) (en banc) (construing
state law); Rath Packing Co. v. IntercontinentalMeat Traders, Inc., 181 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1970); 0.
N.Jonas Co. v. B &PSales Corp., 232 Ga. 256, 206 S.E.2d 437 (1974) (construing state law); Marshall Egg Transport Co. v. Bender-Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161 (1967) (construing
state law); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) (construing state law); Sun-X
Int'l Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
Id.
Courts have found it easier to sustain jurisdiction over a nonresident seller. As the Iowa Supreme Court
said in Rath Packing Co. v. InternationalMeat Traders, Inc., the plaintiff can "rely on the rule that an act outside
the forum state which produces consequences in that state is sufficient to give it judicial jurisdiction." 181
N.W.2d 184, 188 (Iowa 1970). The Court also noted that the state has an interest for damages sustained
from a product brought into the state. 181 N.W.2d at 189.
105 See, e.g., Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977).
106 See, e.g., United States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & Detroit Rail Co., 495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir.
1974).
107 See, e.g., Colony Press Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 Ill. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974).
108 See, e.g., O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971).
109 See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
110 See, e.g., United States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & Detroit Rail Co., 495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir.
1974).
111 See text accompanying notes 68-81 supra.
112 See text accompanying notes 16-30 supra.
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subject a foreign corporate purchaser to jurisdiction after Woodson, a court
must consider not only whether such an exercise of jurisdiction is fair to the
defendant, but also whether it is compatible with the state's obligation "to the
principles of interstate federalism. 1 1 3 The "foreseeability criterion" 114 of
Woodson appears to embody this new concern for interstate federalism as well as
the concern for fairness to the defendant." 5 Viewed in this light, "foreseeability" provides a significant guideline in out-of-state purchaser cases and, indeed,
seems to have been anticipated by some state courts. 1 6 It would be difficult to
argue that it is either fundamentally unfair to a defendant purchaser or a
burden on the interstate system to subject a commercial enterprise to the
jurisdiction of a state into whose courts it reasonably expected to be haled.
Woodson's foreseeability criterion hardly provides a "litmus test" for
jurisdictional issues in contract cases involving foreign purchaser defendants. It
does, however, substantially diminish the present uncertainty by permitting a
more precise factual assessment than that exhibited by the cases cited by Mr.
Justice White."17 Woodson repeatedly emphasizes "purposefulness": 1' 8 the
foreign corporation's having taken steps which can be construed objectively as
exhibiting an intent to submit to and to seek the protection of the jurisdiction of
the forum state." t 9 Defendants must be able "to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit."120 Within these guidelines, it seems clearly insuffi-

cient to premise jurisdiction on the mere fact that the foreign corporation
entered into a contract by mail or electronic communications with the resident
plaintiff and thereby, in some abstract way, affected the economy of the plaintiffs home state.' 2' Nor would the fact that the defendant inspected the goods
at the plaintiff's plant or accepted them FOB seem a sufficient indicium of having sought the protection of the forum. On the other hand, a defendant's active
supervision of or actual participation in plaintiffs work might evidence a contrary intent.
One of the most explicit ways a nonresident defendant could manifest an
intent to be subject to a particular state's jurisdiction is by specifically electing
to be governed by the substantive law of that jurisdiction. Some of the state
113 444 U.S. at 293.
114 Id. at 296-97. See also note 112 supra.
115 444 U.S. at 293-94, 297. In discussing the states' obligation to respect the sovereignty of their sister
states, the Woodson Court emphasized the "orderly administration of the laws." 444 U.S. at 294, quoting
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 319. The Court returned to that phrase several paragraphs later, declaring that
"the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is that the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at
297. This foreseeability criterion can be treated as a specific embodiment of the interstate federalism concern of Woodson as well as of the fairness to the defendant concern.

116 See, e.g., Proctor and Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 12, 323 A.2d 11
(1974).
117 See text accompanying notes 105-10 supra.
118 444 U.S. at 296-99.
119 Id. at 297.
120 Id.
121 Compare Marshall Egg Trans. Co. v. Bender-Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161 (1967)
(no jurisdiction over New York purchaser-defendant who placed order by telephone and later sent check to
Minnesota seller-plaintiff; defendant had no office, no place of business, and no agents within Minnesota)
with State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc., v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968) (jurisdiction
upheld over Florida purchaser-defendant who ordered plywood by telephone from Oregon and thereby produced substantial business consequences in Oregon).
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decisions noted injustice White's dissent appear to have relied, at least in part,
on such a declaration. 122 Such a clear statement by a nonresident defendant
that it seeks the protection of the forum and expects to have matters affecting
the transaction litigated within that forum, although not dispositive, 1 23 seems
worthy of great weight.
V. Choice of Law-Is Woodson Relevant?
A. The Problem
In his famous Cardozo Lecture at Columbia University in December
1944,124 Justice Jackson lamented the Supreme Court's inattention to the
federal constitutional limitations on choice of law rules. It is difficult, he said,
"to point to any field in which the Court has more completely demonstrated or
more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of a legal character than
u 25
in trying to determine what choice of law is required by the Constitution.'
For Justice Jackson, the Court's insistence on national cohesion in matters of
political power and economic control stood in ironic contrast to its tolerance of
"the most localized and conflicting system of any country which presents the
26
external appearance of nationhood.'
The years since the Justice's lecture have seen the continuation of this
paradox. During the past decade, the Court has manifested in other doctrinal
27
It
areas a pronounced, if somewhat uneven, concern for interstate harmony.
1 28
and a distinct willingness
has shown little sympathy for protectionist activity
to base its decisions on the actual economic impact of the arrangement in issue
regardless of its label. 1 29 Yet Justice Jackson's comment remains true today; it
122 See, e.g., Manufacturer's Lease Plans Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 565 P.2d
864 (1977); Proctor & Schwartz Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974);
O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
123 There are circumstances, however, where the parties' choice of law may not indicate an expectation
to be subject to the courts of that jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, Comment f(1971): "[W]hen contracting in countries whose legal systems are strange to them as well as relatively
immature, the parties should be able to choose a law on the ground that they know it well and that it is sufficiently developed." Parties may couple such a choice of law provision with ajurisdiction-selecting clause indicating that both parties will submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal. See generally
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
124 Jackson, FullFaith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, reprinted in 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1945).
125 Id. at 28.
126 Id. at 31.
127 See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 444 U.S. 962 (1980) (the full faith and credit clause
does not bar supplemental award under District of Columbia Workman's Compensation Act to injured
employee who had previously received award under Virginia Workman's Compensation Act); Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 100 S.Ct. 2271 (1980) (South Dakota's policy during cement shortage of confining sales of stateproduced cement to South Dakota residents is not violative of commerce clause); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
U.S. 518 (1978), (privileges and immunities clause ofarticle IV does forbid "Alaska Hire" statute requiring
preference for Alaskans in all employment dealing with oil and gas leases); Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (privileges and immunities clause of article IV does not forbid a state's favoring its own citizens in a hunting licensing scheme).
128 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding void a regulation which
discriminated against out-of-state refuse); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (holding void a labeling scheme designed to deprive Washington State apples of a market advantage).
129 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding state legislation forbidding a producer or refiner of petroleum products from operating a retail service station); Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1976) (striking down New Hampshire "Commuters Income Tax" as implementing a tax structure discriminatory to out-of-state residents).
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is "easier for the Court to put aside parochialism and think in terms of a national economy or of a national social welfare than to think in terms of a truly
national legal system.' ' 30 In choice of law, the obscure, vacillating case law
which precipitatedJusticeJackson's remarks 31 was distilled in the early '60s to
the toothless rule that
[w]here more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the
States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the1law
32
of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity.
In Shaffer, the Court went out of its way to remark that a mere interest in the
subject matter of the litigation may suffice to permit a state to apply its own
law, even though such an interest would never be a sufficient predicate for
33
jurisdiction.
It is always risky to speculate about the reasons for the Supreme Court's
activity or inactivity within a particular area of our national jurisprudence.
However, it is probably safe to assume that the Court's inactivity in the area of
choice of law was due to several factors. First, to the extent that choice of law
rules were linked .to the conceptualism of the vested rights theory of
jurisprudence,1 34 the establishment of rigid constitutional standards for those
rules would have transformed all choice of law principles into constitutional
rules.135 Second, while the "interest analysis" approach to choice of law underwent its tumultuous early development, it would have made little sense for the
Supreme Court to retard its growth through the imposition of constitutional
rules. In most states today, the interest analysis approach has not only replaced
the fixed rules grounded in vested rights conceptualism but has itself matured
36
to the point where new developments have leveled off.'
Because the prudential reasons for adhering to a "laissez-faire" policy
toward constitutional limitations on choice of law no longer exist, the time may
well be ripe for the Court to focus on the federal constitutional limitations on
state choice of law rules. Certainly, no court would approach this task eagerly.
The early cases on constitutional limitations in choice of law offer little
130 Jackson, supra note 124 at 33.
131 The federal constitutional limitations on choice of law have been addressed by the Supreme Court in
four basic doctrinal settings: the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; the full faith and credit
clause of article IV; the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; and the commerce clause.
These lines of authority are set forth in R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 495-547
(2d ed. 1980); Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976); Kurgis,
The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976).
132 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962).
133 433 U.S. at 215-16. See also, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-27 (1979). At least one previous invitation to reopen the standard of Richards, 369 U.S. at 15, had been declined. See Confederation of Life Ins.
Co. v. DeLara, 409 U.S. 953 (1972) (Brennan,J. dissenting). See also Sedler,JudicialJurisdiction
and Choice of
Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REv. 1031 (1978).
134 For a summary of the vested rights theory ofjurisprudence and its effect on the early American conflict of laws theory, see R. LEFLAR, supra note 96, at 5-6.
135 See, e.g., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953) (where the Court upheld the constitutionality of the forum's applying its own statute of limitations despite the common law exception that a
time limitation be considered substantive when closely linked to the substantive cause of action.) For the
Court, "[d]ifferences based upon whether the foreign right was known to the common law or upon the arrangement of the code of the foreign state are too unsubstantial to form the basis of constitutional distinctions.
...Id. at 518.
136 See Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 10 (1977).
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guidance. 3 7 Although the best scholars on the Court1 3 8 and in the academic
world13 9 have attempted to address Justice Jackson's criticism that these cases
were "less penetrating and less constructive ... than in other fields," 140 even a
brief review of the principal cases evokes William Prosser's remark about the
"quaking quagmire' 4 1 of conflict of laws.
B. The Possible Role of Woodson
A functional relationship between jurisdictional and choice of law standards has always been acknowledged, albeit imprecisely, by courts and
scholars. As Justice Jackson noted:
[I]t is more than a coincidence that nowhere else in the modern world is
judicial authority so dispersed among disjointed and insular units, nowhere
else is the place of trial so regulated as a by-product of territorial limits on
jurisdiction, and nowhere else does litigation present such a multitude and
complexity of controversies over conflict of laws.142
In his recent illuminating article, Professor Martin described the situation
more graphically:
When the approach that allows a state to apply its own law in marginal
cases is augmented by expanded bases of jurisdiction and the mechanism of
the class action, the combination raises the specter of massive invasions by one
state into the policies of another, rigidly enforced by the rules of full faith and
credit to judgments. The results thus obtained would be attributable not 43to a
rational process of comparing interests but to a race to the courthouse.
Just as other jurisdictional refinements have eliminated questionable
choice of law decisions, 144 after Woodson, this functional relationship between
jurisdiction and choice of law may well eliminate one of the most questionable
137 See text accompanying notes 124-33 supra. The Martin-Kurgis debate, see note 131 supra, sharply illustrates the difficulty of relying on earlier case law.
138 See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 414 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
139 See Martin, supra note 131; Kurgis, supra note 131. Earlier attempts include Horowitz, The Commerce
Clauseas a Limitation on State Choice ofLaw Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971); Baxter, ChoiceofLaw and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Leflar, ConstitutionalLimits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706, 716 (1963); Currie and Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1960); Currie and Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Privilege and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960); Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REV. 449 (1959); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of
Law: Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1958); Hilpert and Cooley, The
Federal Constitution and Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 27 (1939).
140 Jackson, supra note 124 at 34.
141 "[Tlhe realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited
by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it." Prosser, Interstate
Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
142 Jackson, supra note 124, at 23.
143 Martin, supra note 131, at 230.
144 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), eliminated jurisdiction based on the attachment of property
in the state when there is no connection between the property and the cause of action. See note 19 supra. Rush
also eliminated the possibility of such a forum's applying its own law to resolve the dispute. Rush would thus
have precluded the questionable use of New York law in Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973),
since in that case jurisdiction was based on a Rush-type attachment. Rosenthal v. Warren, 342 F. Supp.
246, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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choice of law situations. Most courts asserting jurisdiction over a defendant on
the basis of transient presence apply the law of some other jurisdiction with a
closer relationship to the problem, using either traditional choice of law rules or
a variation of the interest analysis approach.1 45 However, a forum asserting
jurisdiction on the basis of transitory presence might compound the imposition
on its sister states by also insisting on the application of its own substantive
law 146 simply because it is the forum's law or because the forum considers it
"the better law."
The elimination of transient presence as a basis of jurisdiction because of
interstate comity concerns would also preclude any choice of law decision further violating the same constitutional policy. Similarly, to the extent that Woodson indicates a more restrictive interpretation of traditional long-arm jurisdiction, 147 chauvinistic choice of law decisions would also be eliminated. To borrow from Professor Ehrenzweig,1 48 the elimination of an "improper" forum by
preventing the exercise of jurisdiction based on transitory presence
automatically precludes that forum's application of an "improper" law, its
own.
Despite recognition of this functional relationship between jurisdiction
and choice of law, the precise nature of the doctrinal relationship between these
two areas has remained undefined. Some commentators 49 and the Court
itself' 50 have acknowledged that jurisdictional and choice of law inquiries are
governed by the same factors, but have assumed that the qualitative appraisal
of those factors differed depending on the inquiry: the jurisdictional inquiry
focused on fairness to the defendant while the choice of law inquiry focused on
such institutional concerns as interstate harmony, using either due process or
full faith and credit analysis.
With Woodson's emphasis on interstate federalism as an important policy
consideration in the delineation of jurisdictional standards, there would seem
at first glance to be a distinct convergence of the theoretical underpinnings of
jurisdiction and choice of law analysis. The Court's emphasis on "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies' 5' 1 and "the shared interest of the several States in furthering
145 When jurisdiction is truly based on "transient presence," the forum will have no other connection
with either the cause of action or the defendant. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra. Therefore, under
the traditional "fixed" choice of law rules (lex loci delicti, lex loci contractus), such a forum would apply the
law of the state of the tort, of the making of the contract, or of the performance of the contract. Under the
more modern choice of law methodologies such as "center of gravity" or "government interest analysis,"
the forum also ought to apply the law of a state with more interest in the subject matter of the litigation. For
an up-to-date summary of these various choice of law theories, see R. LEFLAR, supra note 96, at 173-222.
146 See Ehrenzweig, A ProperLaw In a ProperForum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach, " 18 OKLA.
L. REv. 340, 350-52 (1965). See, e.g., Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972) (Kentucky court, exercising jurisdiction over an Ohio defendant by personal service, applied Kentucky law rather than Ohio guest
statute for accident occurring in Ohio and resulting in death of Kentucky resident).
147 See text accompanying notes 100-23 supra.
148 Ehrenzweig, supra note 146, at 350.
149 See, e.g., Hay, The InterrelationofJurisdictionand Choice of Law In UnitedStates Conflicts Law, 28 INT'L &
CoMP. L. Q. 161 (1979).
150 For instance, in Shaffer, Justice Marshall went out of his way to reject specifically "the argument that
if a State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties
to that dispute." 433 U.S. at 215. While a state's demonstrated "interest" in the matter might support a
choice of law determination, it would not necessarily support an assertion of in personam jurisdiction where
the touchstone was whether the state would be "a fair forum for this litigation." Id. See also Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
151 444 U.S. at 292.
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fundamental substantive social policies" 152 invokes the same values which have
controlled most of the Court's inquiries into the constitutional limitations on
choice of law. 153 With the rejuvenation of the interstate federalism aspect of
jurisdictional due process, the constitutional criteria for "what law may govern
and what law court may act' '1 5 4 ought to approach congruity.
There are problems with this prognosis, however. Hanson v. Denckla, while
acknowledging the importance of interstate federalism1 5 5 (although certainly
not to the same extent as Woodson), 156 also distinguished the principles governing jurisdiction and choice of law.1 57 Furthermore, although interstate
federalism considerations may have traditionally influenced constitutional
limitations on choice of law, the present Court has shown little concern for
these considerations in the choice of law context.15 8 Consequently, rather than
indicating a possible convergence of the controlling constitutional concerns in
jurisdiction and choice of law, Woodson may signify only that the Court's sensitivity to the aggregate effect of jurisdiction and choice of law rules on in159
terstate relations is increasing.
In short, it is the combined jurisdiction-choice of law decision which
should reflect the concerns of interstate federalism and fairness to the defen1 60
dant. For example, when a trial court bases its jurisdiction on domicile,
residence, 161 or continuously and systematically doing business, 162 reviewing
courts should be far more sensitive to the requirements of interstate federalism
in scrutinizing the choice of law rule selected by the court. Although it might be
both fundamentally fair and compatible with interstate federalism to require 4
defendant to answer for all litigation in a particular forum, it may offend prin-.
ciples of interstate federalism if that forum resolves the dispute according to its
own substantive law. 63 While the forum's connection with the defendant may
152 Id.
153 See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224-25 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
154 Leflar, supra note 139, at 707.
155 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
156 See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
157 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) A state "does not acquire that jurisdiction by being
the 'center of gravity,' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law." Id. at 254.
158 See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-27 (1979) (neither the full faith and credit clause nor general
principles of interstate comity require California to recognize the limitations on Nevada's statutory waiver
of its immunity in suit against Nevada in California court with respect to California accident).
159 As Professor Weintraub has noted:
What choice-of-law rules are desirable depends in large part on the current scope ofjudicial
jurisdiction. The proper breadth of a court's jurisdiction, in turn, should be decided with
reference to what law that court will apply if it adjudicates the case in issue.
R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 97, at 93.
160 See note 96 supra.
161 See note 96 supra.
162 See note 97 supra.
163 The Supreme Court has the opportunity to resolve this question in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 100 S.
Ct. 1012 (1980). This case involves a Wisconsin accident in which Hague, a Wisconsin resident, was killed
when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a car owned and operated by an uninsured Wisconsin resident. At the time of the accident, Hague owned an Allstate policy covering his three automobiles. The
policy included uninsured motorist coverage to the limit of $15,000 for each automobile. Wisconsin law does
not permit "stacking" uninsured motorist coverage and would only permit one recovery of $15,000.
Hague's widow married a Minnesota resident and established a residence in Minnesota. Having been appointed personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband in Minnesota, Mrs. Hague brought a
declaratory action in Minnesota seeking an adjudication against Allstate that Minnesota law, which permits
"stacking," would apply. Allstate continuously and systematically does business in Minnesota. The Minnesota court held that Minnesota law applies. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979).
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be strong, its connection with the subject matter of litigation may be minimal.
Scrutinizing jurisdiction-choice of law decisions in their totality would
avoid the danger which appears to have cooled the Supreme Court's desire to
deal with constitutional limitations on choice of law. 64 There is little danger
that such scrutiny would "constitutionalize" choice of law rules, since at most
it would require states choosing to exercise jurisdiction on some basis other
than their connection with the litigation to adopt a choice of law rule which
would not impose their own substantive policies in the resolution of the
dispute.
Beyond this, the influence of Woodson upon future choice of law decisions
by the Supreme Court will probably be more attitudinal than doctrinal.
Because the manifold constitutional issues which the Court confronts each term
often involve common constitutional policy concerns, the Court's work in one
doctrinal area sheds a "cross-light" 65 on other areas involving the same policy
concerns. The Court's new interest in interstate federalism may thus lead it to
more carefully examine cases posing choice of law problems. The Court need
not wait long to begin this examination, since many choice of law decisions of
relatively recent vintage and of questionable merit have had interstate
federalism implications. 66 Such cases may meet a more critical judicial eye at
the Supreme Court in the future.
VI. Conclusion
Conclusions about the long-term doctrinal contributions of Woodson must
necessarily be tentative. While instant analysis-whether of Presidential
speeches, professional football plays or Supreme Court decisions-seems to be
the vogue, a proper respect for what Justice Frankfurter termed "the

Perhaps the best existing authority for the adoption of the position in the text (and, it would seem, the reversal of Hague) is John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). In that case, an insurance
policy was issued to a New Yorker. Under New York law, a false answer on the insurance application was
an absolute bar to recovery. The insured made a false statement on his application concerning his health
and died shortly thereafter. His widow then moved to Georgia where she brought suit on the policy.
Jurisdiction was properly obtained over the insurance company since it systematically did business within
the state. At trial, the Georgia court instructed the jury according to Georgia law that the widow could
recover if the issuing agent was aware of the truth regardless of statements to the contrary in the application.
In reversing the judgment for the widow, the Court noted that "there was no occurrence, nothing done, to
which the law of Georgia could apply." Id. at 182.
164 See text accompanying notes 124-36 supra.
165 Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 402-09 (1972); See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-83
n.14 (1975).
166 In addition to Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) and Confederation of Life Ins. v.
DeLara, 409 U.S. 953 (1972), perhaps the best-known instance of a choice of law decision with significant
interstate federalism implications was Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). The estate of a New York domiciliary brought a wrongful death action against the
airline on an accident occurring in Massachusetts during a flight originating in New York. The court entertained the action on the basis of the Massachusetts statute but declined, on public policy grounds, to enforce
the severe damage limitations of that statute. In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962),
the court held this methodology constitutional over the dissent ofJudge Friendly who argued that "[t]he
Full Faith and Credit Clause insures that, in making its choice, the legislature creating the claim need not
have to weigh the risk that the courts of sister states looking to its 'public acts' as a source of rights will
disregard substantial conditions which it has imposed .. " Id. at 565. There have also been a significant
number of cases in which the forum state has applied its own law whenever its domiciliary was the plaintiff.
See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
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rhythm" 167 of constitutional adjudication requires that a more extensive critique of the case's significance await its exposure to subsequent litigation. As
its holding receives the renewed scrutiny implicit in the common law method of
precedent and stare decisis, Woodson's lasting significance will become more
evident.
This article has set forth the doctrinal contributions of Woodson to the
Supreme Court's exploration of the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction
and choice of law. It has suggested that the Court formulated in Woodson a new
doctrinal formula of jurisdictional limitation which confirms the dual policy
concerns of interstate federalism and fairness to the defendant and then takes
significant, albeit preliminary, steps to harmonize those concerns. This article
has also suggested that Woodson provides a basis from which the Court may
more boldly address concrete jurisdictional problems.
By transforming the state sovereignty concern of Pennoyer into a broader
concern for interstate federalism, Woodson has displaced the theoretical basis of
transient jurisdiction. Its impact on other areas of jurisdiction may be less
dramatic but no less significant. Although the general predicates ofjurisdiction
will almost certainly survive, future case law will likely stress foreseeability as
an embodiment of both interstate federalism and fairness to the defendant.
This emphasis on "fairness" and "federalism" in jurisdictional matters
should lead to a greater acknowledgement of both the practical and the doctrinal affinity of jurisdiction and choice of law matters. While there is little
basis for suggesting that the Court will (or ought to) merge jurisdiction and
choice of law considerations, it would be appropriate for the Court to approach
jurisdiction and choice of law decisions as a totality, appraising their aggregate
effect on fairness and federalism.
Although Woodson could serve as the basis for this doctrinal and practical
consolidation, the Supreme Court's behavior pattern requires a note of caution. Many cases have falsely seemed upon their rendition to be the "last
word" in personal jurisdiction. In the choice of law area especially, the Court
has shown a distinct lack of enthusiasm for bold doctrinal strokes. Woodson's
capacity to effect the changes suggested in this article depends largely upon
how sustained an interest the Court demonstrates in the constitutional value of
interstate federalism in the juridical relations of the sister states.1 68 If interstate
federalism is to affect the broad spectrum of jurisdiction-choice of law decisions, it must be translated into specific and workable criteria which avoid the
problems of overconstitutionalization.
The Supreme Court has established in Woodson a foundation for comprehensive and lasting doctrinal development. But the strength of that foundation and the shape of the superstructure it will support are, at this point,
beyond the capabilities of sterile academic measure. If the Supreme Court
shows a sustained interest in the area and if lower courts set about the work of

167

Frankfurter, The Supreme Court, reprinted in P. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT:

EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

448 (1970). Wrote the justice, "[a] rhythm,

even though not reducible to law, is manifest in the history of Supreme Court adjudication. Manifold and
largely undiscerned factors determine general tendencies at the Court ......
168 See text accompanying notes 130-31 supra.
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implementing its policies in appropriate contexts, a new stability may soon
characterize the chronically elusive areas of constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law.

